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Abstract
I examine the role of word of mouth in consumer's product discovery process and its
implications for the ﬁrm. A monopolist supplies an assortment of horizontally diﬀerentiated
products and consumers search for a product that matches their taste by sampling products
from the assortment or by seeking product recommendations from other consumers. I analyze
the underlying consumer interactions that lead to the emergence of word of mouth, examine
the optimal pricing and assortment strategy of the ﬁrm, and explain the impact of word of
mouth on the concentration of sales within the assortment. The model provides a rationale
for the long tail phenomenon, explains recent empirical ﬁndings in online retail, and is well
suited for product categories such as music, ﬁlm, books, and video game entertainment.
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1 Introduction
Word of mouth is fundamental to the product discovery process of consumers. In product categories
such as music, ﬁlm, books, or video games, consumers often identify products that match their
taste through the recommendations of others. And with the expansion of electronic commerce,
consumers are increasingly accessing these recommendations online. Retailers have embraced the
transition by hosting consumer word of mouth on their websites, inviting consumer feedback about
products and displaying it on their product pages. Moreover, retailers are exploiting such feedback
to generate personalized product recommendations for their customers. The online retail environ-
ment has therefore become an important venue for consumers to obtain product recommendations.
Consider how Amazon exploits product recommendations to foster product discovery. A new
customer visiting Amazon.com is presented with bestselling products on the storefront and invited
to sign in to see personalized recommendations. Once the customer has created an account and
signed in, the storefront is updated to list product recommendations prominently under headings
such as recommendations for you, related to items you've viewed, inspired by your shopping
trends, customers who bought items in your recent history also bought, and so on. Similarly,
visiting a product page will list related product recommendations under what other items do
customers buy after viewing this item? and customers who bought this item also bought. These
product recommendations are generated by an automated recommender system, which exploits
Amazon's large stock of consumer feedback to identify potential matches between customers and
products. Customers who may have otherwise resorted to oine word of mouth, seeking product
recommendations from others within their social circles, can now readily access an almost endless
supply of them through Amazon's algorithms.
This paper presents a model of consumer search to explain the impact of product recommen-
dations on consumer product discovery and the concentration of sales. The model explains the
ﬁrm's incentives to increase the eﬃciency of word of mouth: to lower the cost for consumers to
access product recommendations and to improve the matching between consumers and the prod-
ucts they are recommended. The model also explains the consequences of such improvements for
consumers and for the concentration of sales within the ﬁrm's assortment. Both are intrinsically
linked. When consumers with more prevalent preferences are the main beneﬁciaries of the eﬃciency
improvements, the concentration of sales increases generating a superstar eﬀect. This increases
the performance of bestselling products. When consumers with less prevalent preferences are the
main beneﬁciaries, as empirical evidence suggests is the case with the recent expansion of electronic
commerce, the concentration of sales is reduced generating a long tail eﬀect. As a result, prod-
ucts representing a small share of total sales (located in the tail of the sales distribution) perform
better in the online channel, as ﬁrst noted by Anderson (2004). The model reconciles lower sales
concentration in online retail with the ﬁrm's logic for proﬁt maximization, and informs the design
of marketing strategies to exploit consumer word of mouth.
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The intuition for the long tail result can be outlined with an example. A large share of
the consumer population has mainstream preferences, and a smaller share has niche preferences.
Other factors equal, oine word of mouth tends to beneﬁt mainstream consumers the most, because
product recommendations more often originate from consumers with mainstream preferences. This
drives mainstream consumers to participate more in the market, which increases the sales of
products preferred by mainstream consumers in the oine environment. What happens when
the word of mouth process moves online and improves its eﬃciency? This levels the playing ﬁeld
across consumers, beneﬁting those with niche preferences the most. As a result, niche consumers
participate more and this increases the sales of their preferred products in the online environment,
reducing the concentration of sales and generating a long tail eﬀect.
The example oversimpliﬁes the problem, of course. Consumer search strategies and product
prices are jointly determined by the interactions that arise in the marketplace. On the one hand,
niche consumers are not dependent on word of mouth to discover products. They can resort to
searching the assortment to discover products that match their taste. On the other hand, the ﬁrm
will account for the fact that mainstream consumers beneﬁt more from word of mouth when pricing
products, and higher prices can overturn their advantage. The modeling exercise presented below
formalizes these aspects of the problem, endogenizing consumer search strategies and product
prices, and shows that the long tail eﬀect continues to hold.
1.1 Literature
To the best of my knowledge, no previous theoretical work has explored the links between word
of mouth and sales concentration. Recent literature contributions have explored how changes
in consumer search trigger supply-side shifts that aﬀect the concentration of sales. Bar-Isaac,
Caruana and Cuñat (2012) model how reductions in consumer search costs aﬀect product design
choices on the supply side of the market, which can lead to lower sales concentration by increasing
the market shares of ﬁrms with rare designs. Yang (2013) analyzes how consumer search costs
and targetability aﬀects product variety, and shows that improvements in search can lower the
concentration of sales by ensuring less popular product varieties are produced by ﬁrms. These
contributions provide important insights on how consumer search aﬀects the variety of products
supplied in the market, and therefore the concentration of sales.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that factors beyond the variety of products supplied are
contributing to lower sales concentration online. Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester (2011) examine
sales concentration within the assortment of a multi-channel clothing retailer and ﬁnd that, even
when supply-side factors such as product availability and visibility are held constant, the Internet
channel exhibits signiﬁcantly less concentration than the catalog channel. Elberse and Oberholzer-
Gee (2008) report similar ﬁndings comparing the oine and online sales of a large sample of DVD
and VHS video titles. This paper shows that improvements in the eﬃciency of word of mouth, for
3
instance driven by recommender systems, can explain these ﬁndings.
The empirical literature has also shown that facilitating word of mouth and personalized prod-
uct recommendations has a positive impact on sales, consistent with the ﬁndings derived below.
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) analyze the impact of consumer reviews of books on Amazon and
Barnes and Noble's websites, and ﬁnd that reviews increase the relative sales at the retailer they
are posted on. De, Hu, and Rahman (2010) examine online retailer activity logs and show that
recommender systems increases sales volume. Moreover, and consistent with the model's predic-
tions when niche consumers beneﬁt the most, recommender systems have been shown to lower the
concentration of sales. In their study of a multi-channel retailer cited above, Brynjolfsson, Hu,
and Simester (2011) analyze the retailer's website logs and ﬁnd that the recommender system is
the major contributor to the concentration shift observed in online sales. Oestreicher-Singer and
Sundararajan (2010) ﬁnd that sales concentration is lower among book categories on Amazon.com
where the recommender system is expected to be more accurate. Ehrmann and Schmale (2008)
report similar ﬁndings on Amazon.de. Fleder and Hosanagar (2007) use simulations to evaluate
the impact of diﬀerent recommender systems on sales concentration and sales volume.
Recent contributions also ﬁnd that niche consumers beneﬁt the most from online word of mouth.
Feng and Zhang (2010) show that online consumer reviews of video games have a stronger impact
on niche products. Tan and Netessine (2011) examine the supply of new titles on Netﬂix and
conclude that recommender systems play an important role in guiding niche consumers to discover
new releases. Sun (2011) shows that product ratings are more informative for niche consumers
when presented together with the variance of ratings, as is frequently the case in online retail.
Choi and Bell (2011) argue that e-commerce attracts preference minorities who are not well served
by brick and mortar stores due to the constraints of physical distribution.
1.2 A search framework for word of mouth
I build on the modeling foundation for consumer search with diﬀerentiated products developed
by Wolinsky (1986) and extended by Anderson and Renault (1999). Consumers arrive to the
market uninformed about products. Each consumer can become informed by sequentially drawing
products from the assortment, incurring a search cost on each product draw and observing the
price and the utility derived from the product. Consumers form a correct expectation of the value
of search and decide whether participate or not in the market. I focus on the monopoly case where
all products are supplied by a single ﬁrm, so consumers search across the ﬁrm's assortment.1
The modeling foundation assumes that consumers observe product price and product utility
1Search costs can be interpreted as the costs of acquiring information in the market. A consumer with zero
search cost (consumer si = 0 in the model) incurs no positive cost to observe the price and the utility derived
from all products. Note that if all consumers had zero search costs, the outcome is equivalent to the case where
consumers are perfectly informed about the assortment. In this case all products are priced at u, all consumers
purchase, and no word of mouth arises because consumers do not beneﬁt from product recommendations.
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simultaneously on each draw. This keeps the analysis simple by ensuring consumers do not infer
product utility based on product price, or vice versa. For example, if consumers could observe
product prices before searching  given that product prices are more salient than product utility in
many retail contexts  they could use this information to infer product utility without engaging in
search (if the ﬁrm sets a diﬀerent price for each product type in equilibrium). The assumption rules
out the possibility that the ﬁrm uses prices as a signaling device to reduce consumer search costs,
which is reasonable for categories where products are horizontally diﬀerentiated such as music,
ﬁlms, books, or video games. In these categories, consumer preferences are highly idiosyncratic
and prices tend to be a weak predictor of the utility of products.2
I consider two product types and two consumer types in the model, which simpliﬁes the anal-
ysis though the results extend to a larger number of types. I enrich consumer search by letting
consumers choose among two alternative search strategies: they can search the assortment by
sampling products directly (as in standard search models) or they can search with word of mouth
by seeking product recommendations. The odds when drawing from the assortment will depend on
the assortment's product composition, and the odds when drawing recommendations will depend
on the composition of consumers who provide them. Assortment search takes place ﬁrst, so con-
sumers who search the assortment become the providers of recommendations in the market. The
richness of the setup originates from the interdependencies that arise with word of mouth: if more
consumers of a given type search the assortment, consumers of that type will beneﬁt more from
drawing recommendations. This implies that the utility consumers derive from word of mouth is
endogenously determined in equilibrium, and will depend on the search strategy choices across the
whole consumer population.
The motivation for this approach is twofold. First, it addresses the chicken-and-egg problem of
how consumers become informed about products in order to provide recommendations to others.
Clearly, some consumers have to explore the assortment ﬁrst for others to beneﬁt from informed
recommendations, so incorporating assortment search into the problem explicitly accounts for this
process. And second, it allows the model to explain the emergence of word of mouth and the
composition of consumers who participate in it. Given that consumers can search the assortment
or stay out of the market instead of searching with word of mouth, they will only do so if it pays
oﬀ.
The eﬃciency of word of mouth in the model hinges on two factors: the cost for consumers
to obtain product recommendations and the degree of preference matching in the process, which
2When products are vertically diﬀerentiated, standard models predict that price and quality are positively
correlated. For example, if smartphones can be ranked according to technical speciﬁcations and consumers agree
that these speciﬁcations are the relevant dimension of diﬀerentiation in this product category, then consumers can
correctly infer that a high-price smartphone will yield higher utility than a low-price smartphone. In models of
horizontal diﬀerentiation, in contrast, prices are not informative of the utility provided by products. High-price
products can yield lower utility than low-price products to some consumers. For example, it can be argued that the
retail price of a book is a poor predictor of the utility it will provide to a reader. The analysis is therefore better
suited to product categories where the horizontal diﬀerentiation dimension prevails.
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increases the likelihood that consumers are recommended one of their preferred products. This
allows the model to encompass recommender systems in the context of online retail as well as
traditional word of mouth exchanges in the oine context. In the online environment, the cost
of recommendations is low because recommender systems readily supply recommendations on de-
mand. In the oine environment, the cost of recommendations is higher because consumers need
to engage in social interactions to obtain them. The degree of preference matching is high in the
online context because recommender systems match consumers based on their product prefer-
ences, increasing the likelihood of successful recommendations.3 In the oine context there is
no matching mechanism intermediating the exchange, so preference matching tends to be lower.
Nonetheless, consumers can seek to interact with those who provided successful recommendations
in the past, so the degree of matching in the oine context will increase with consumer's aware-
ness of the product preferences of others (i.e., with the observability of consumption patterns or
opportunities for joint consumption).
I need to make assumptions about the provision of product recommendations to model the
word of mouth exchange. I proceed by assuming consumers only provide recommendations in the
market when this beneﬁts others. The setup can be understood as a pull-based word of mouth
process, where consumers only speak when others who share their product preferences listen. So
when consumers of both types search with word of mouth, consumers of both types who previously
searched the assortment provide recommendations. And when only one consumer type searches
with word of mouth, only consumers of that same type provide recommendations. In the online
context, the setup can be reconciled with the fact that recommender systems exhibit high accuracy
when addressing an homogeneous audience (a single consumer type).4 In the oine context, the
setup implies that consumers are not willing to engage in the word of mouth exchange when no-
one shares their product preferences. I discuss the potential implications of a push-based word of
mouth process where consumers speak regardless of who listens in Section 4.
The next section formalizes the building blocks of the model, and table 1 summarizes the
notation. Consumer search strategies are characterized as a function of product prices in Section
3Collaborative ﬁltering algorithms play an important role in recommender systems. The simplest instance of a
collaborative ﬁlter exploits a database containing a set C of consumers, a set N of products, and the ratings that
consumers have provided for products. If consumer ci has not rated product nk, an expected value for that rating
can be calculated by E[Rating(ci, nk)] =
∑
jC Similarity(ci, cj) ∗ Rating(cj , nk), where the similarity function
measures the taste proximity of any two consumers based on the correlation of their past product ratings. The
algorithm will recommend to consumer ci the unrated product which obtains a higher expected rating. Thus the
algorithm can be interpreted to draw from the customer base and match consumers with similar preferences in
the process, increasing the likelihood of a successful recommendation. See Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005) for a
taxonomy of recommender systems and an overview of the related computer science literature. For a brief discussion
on the economics of recommender systems, see Resnick and Varian (1997).
4The recommender's task is simpliﬁed when the target audience becomes more homogeneous because this reduces
the variance in the success rate of product recommendations across consumers. Nonetheless, market conﬁgurations
where only one consumer type searches with word of mouth are more relevant to the oine context. The analysis
reveals that both consumer types have strong incentives to seek product recommendations when preference matching
τ is high and recommendation cost w is low, as is the case in the presence of a recommender system.
6
3, which explains the drivers of word of mouth in the model. Section 4 solves equilibrium prices
and explains the implications of word of mouth for the ﬁrm. I analyze the impact of word of
mouth on the concentration of sales within the ﬁrm's assortment in Section 5, and examine the
implications for assortment composition in Section 6. Managerial implications are summarized in
Section 7, and Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a market where a monopolist supplies a product assortment consisting of a continuum of
products of measure one. There is a unit mass of consumers who diﬀer in their product preferences
and in their search costs. The simplest instance of the model that yields the results is that where
there are two types of products over which consumers exhibit a strict preference ranking. To this
end, I partition the assortment into two product types and consider two consumer types. A share
a of products in the assortment is of type 1, and the remaining share 1− a is of type 2. Similarly,
there is a share m of consumers of type 1 and there is a share 1−m of consumers of type 2. All
consumers derive utility u from products of their same type and zero utility from the remaining.
The problem is of interest when the shares of both types diﬀer across consumers and products.
Let m ∈ (1
2
, 1) so that consumers of type 1 are more prevalent in the population, so I will refer
to consumers of type 1 as mainstream consumers and to consumers of type 2 as niche consumers.
Similarly, let a ∈ (1
2
, 1) so that products of type 1 are more prevalent (or prominent) in the
assortment. I will refer to products of type 1 that appeal to mainstream consumers as mainstream
products, and to products of type 2 as niche products.
Consumers face a search problem. They do not observe the utility and the price of individual
products when arriving to the market, so all products appear ex-ante identical. Consumers need
to search in order to identify which products are of their preferred type and observe their prices.
Consumers exhibit unit demand, and may participate in the market to search for and purchase one
of their preferred products or stay out. A product match is achieved when a preferred product is
identiﬁed. Consumers can locate a match either by searching the assortment or by searching with
word of mouth.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm sets prices p1 and p2 for
mainstream and niche products, respectively. In the second stage, consumers may search the
assortment by sequentially drawing products. Consumers draw products randomly from the as-
sortment to sample them, and learn the utility they provide and observe their price. If a draw
yields a match (the product is of the same type as the consumer and yields utility u), the consumer
purchases the product and exits the market. Otherwise, the consumer continues to draw products
until a match is located.
In the third stage, consumers may search with word of mouth by sequentially drawing product
recommendations. These recommendations are provided by consumers who searched the assort-
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t Consumer and product types, where 1=mainstream and 2=niche
m Share of mainstream consumers in the population
a Share of mainstream products in the assortment
p Product prices
u Consumer utility derived from a preferred product
s Cost of sampling a product from the assortment
w Cost of drawing a product recommendation
τ Degree of preference matching with recommendations
µ Expected utility of a new draw
β Match probability when drawing from the assortment
α Match probability when drawing a product recommendation
U Total expected utility of search
D Demand
pi Firm proﬁts
MS Product market shares
Table 1: Key notation used in the paper
ment in the second stage, who recommend the product they matched with to others. Alternatively,
recommendations can be interpreted to be provided by a recommender system, which intermedi-
ates between consumers drawing recommendations and consumers who searched the assortment
(who provide input to the algorithm). Each recommendation enables the consumer to learn the
utility derived from the recommended product and observe its price. If this results in a match, the
consumer purchases the product and exits the market. Otherwise the consumer continues to draw
recommendations until a match is located.
I model the supply and demand of product recommendations with a pull-based process (see
the preceding section for a discussion of the setup). When mainstream and niche consumers
search with word of mouth, consumers of both types who previously searched the assortment
provide recommendations. Parameter τ captures the degree of preference matching in the word of
mouth process. On each recommendation draw, with probability τ ∈ (0, 1) the consumer draws
a recommendation from another consumer of her own type, and with probability 1 − τ draws
a recommendation randomly from the mass of consumers supplying them. The probability of
a product match on each draw is therefore increasing in τ . When only mainstream consumers
or only niche consumers search with word of mouth, only consumers of that same type provide
recommendations. In these cases, recommendations will always yield a match.
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Search is costly for consumers. Each consumer incurs a sampling cost si on each product draw
when searching the assortment, and incurs a recommendation cost w on each recommendation
draw when searching with word of mouth. Sampling costs are uniformly distributed across the
population independently of product preferences, so that the cost of consumer i is given by si ∼
U [0, s]. Letting consumers diﬀer in their search costs ensures that some will prefer to search
the assortment in equilibrium while others will prefer to search with word of mouth. I assume
that s ≥ u so that some consumers are unwilling to search the assortment, which simpliﬁes the
analysis by avoiding corner solutions in the pricing game. I also assume consumers have the
information required to form a correct expectation of the value of both search strategies: they
observe mainstream population m, assortment composition a, and product prices p1 and p2.
3 Consumer search strategies
I proceed by backwards induction and solve for consumer search strategy choices in the second and
third stages. The model provides a rich search framework, and it is useful to review its properties
before solving ﬁrst-stage equilibrium prices in the next section. First I characterize the utility of
search with word of mouth (WOM) in the third stage, then I turn to assortment search in the
second stage, and then pin down consumer choices by comparing the expected utility of both.
Word of mouth search. Consider the problem of an unmatched consumer of type t ∈ {1, 2} in
the third stage. Searching with WOM implies sequentially drawing product recommendations until
a match is located. Denote the probability of locating a product match on each recommendation
draw for consumers of type t by αt. A recommendation will only yield a match if drawn from
another consumer of the same type. Thus αt depends on preference matching τ and the share of
consumers of each type that provide recommendations, to be denoted by rt. There is always a
positive mass of consumers providing recommendations, as will be shown below to be the case, so
αt remains constant throughout the search. Each recommendation draw is a Bernoulli trial with
the same success probability for all consumers of type t given by
αt = (1− τ)rt + τ. (1)
The expected utility of drawing a new recommendation for an unmatched consumer of type t
given αt when her preferred products are priced at pt, to be denoted by µ
w
t , is given by
µwt = αt(u− pt)− w, (2)
as the consumer only purchases if a match is located but incurs recommendation cost w on every
draw. Note that µwt will diﬀer across both consumer types due to match probability αt and prices
pt.
Consumers of type t will prefer to search with WOM rather than staying out of the market if
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µwt ≥ 0. Consumers searching with WOM sequentially draw recommendations until they obtain a
match, which on average requires 1/αt draws for a consumer of type t. The search process ﬁnalizes
once a match is located, searching for a second match cannot provide additional utility given the
assumption that consumers exhibit unit demand.
Assortment search. I next turn to the second stage of the game and characterize direct search
through the assortment. Searching the assortment implies sequentially drawing and sampling
products, and a match is obtained when drawing a product of the consumer's own type. Denote
the match probability on each assortment draw for consumers of type t by βt, where β1 = a and
β2 = 1 − a. Given that βt remains constant throughout the search, each assortment draw is a
Bernoulli trial with success probability βt for all consumers of type t.
The expected utility of a new product draw for an unmatched consumer of type t with sampling
cost si when her preferred products are priced at pt, to be denoted by µ
a
t,i, will be given by
µat,i = βt(u− pt)− si, (3)
given that the consumer only purchases if a match is located but incurs sampling cost si on each
draw. Note that µat,i will vary across types depending on assortment composition a (through βt)
and prices pt, and will also vary within types depending on consumer sampling cost si.
The indiﬀerent participant of type t, denoted by saˆt , is strictly indiﬀerent between searching the
assortment and not participating in the market. This consumer can be identiﬁed by substituting
si for s
aˆ
t in (3) and solving for µ
a
t,i = 0,
saˆt = βt(u− pt). (4)
Consumers of type t with sampling cost si ≤ saˆt prefer to search the assortment rather than
staying out of the market. Consumers searching the assortment sequentially draw products until
a match is located, which on average requires 1/βt draws for a consumer of type t. The search
process ﬁnalizes once a match is located given that consumers exhibit unit demand.
Search strategy choices. I next analyze the search strategy choices of consumers in the
second stage. Note that consumers of type t with low sampling costs (si ≤ saˆt ) derive positive utility
from both search strategies when µwt ≥ 0. These consumers will choose which search strategy to
pursue by comparing the expected utility of both. Consumers will perform this comparison by
accounting for the fact that the expected number of draws required for a match diﬀers between
both strategies, as given by 1/βt and 1/αt. Let U
a
t,i = µ
a
t,i/βt and U
w
t = µ
w
t /αt denote the (total)
expected utility of searching the assortment and searching with WOM, respectively, for a consumer
of type t with search cost si. Note that the expected utility of both search strategies is unaﬀected
by past unsuccessful draws, so a consumer who prefers to search the assortment in the second stage
will never abort the search in order to search with WOM in the third stage.5
5The expressions for Uat,i and U
w
t can also be derived as follows. Because βt remains constant when drawing from
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The indiﬀerent searcher of type t, denoted by swˆt , obtains the same expected utility from both
search strategies. The indiﬀerent searcher is identiﬁed by equating Uat,i = U
w
t ,
u− pt − si
βt
= u− pt − w
αt
, (5)
and substituting si for s
wˆ
t and rearranging,
swˆt =
w βt
αt(swˆt )
. (6)
The solution is given by an implicit equation because αt depends on s
wˆ
1 and s
wˆ
2 when rt < 1 (when
both consumer types search with WOM). I solve the system below.
I can now characterize the search strategy choices of consumers. When µwt ≥ 0, consumers
of type t with sampling cost si ≤ swˆt search the assortment in the second stage and those with
sampling cost si > s
wˆ
t search with WOM in the third stage. When µ
w
t < 0, consumers of type t
with sampling cost si ≤ saˆt search the assortment in the second stage and the remaining stay out
of the market.
Market conﬁgurations. There are four possible combinations of search strategy choices
given the two consumer types. When µw1 ≥ 0 and µw2 ≥ 0 both types search with WOM (market
conﬁguration WW), when µw1 ≥ 0 and µw2 < 0 only mainstream consumers search with WOM (con-
ﬁguration WA), when µw1 < 0 and µ
w
2 ≥ 0 only niche consumers search with WOM (conﬁguration
AW), and when µw1 < 0 and µ
w
2 < 0 neither type searches with WOM (conﬁguration AA).
Closed-form solution. I next pin down equilibrium search strategies as a function of prices.
Let c ∈ {ww,wa, aw, aa} identify the four market conﬁgurations. For consumer types that search
with WOM in market conﬁguration c, denote the indiﬀerent searcher by sct . Consider ﬁrst conﬁg-
uration WW where both types search with WOM. In this conﬁguration, consumers of both types
provide recommendations. The shares of consumers of each type providing recommendations can
be written as a function of the indiﬀerent searchers,
r1 =
(sww1 /s)m
(sww1 /s)m+ (s
ww
2 /s)(1−m)
r2 =
(sww2 /s)(1−m)
(sww1 /s)m+ (s
ww
2 /s)(1−m)
.
Plugging the above expressions for r1 and r2 into αt in (1) for each type, and then plugging α1
and α2 into (6) for each type and substituting s
wˆ
1 for s
ww
1 and s
wˆ
2 for s
ww
2 provides a system of two
equations. The system has a unique solution satisfying sww1 > 0 and s
ww
2 > 0, which is given by
the assortment, Uat,i = βt(u−pt)+(1−βt)Uat,i−si, which implies that Uat,i = u−pt−(si/βt). Similarly, given that αt
remains constant when drawing recommendations, Uwt = αt(u−pt)+(1−αt)Uwt −w, so that Uwt = u−pt− (w/αt).
Equating Uat,i = U
w
t delivers expression (5).
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sww1 =
w(2 am− (1− a−m)τ +M)
2m(1 + τ)
sww2 =
w(2 + τ − (a+m)τ − 2(1− a)m− 2a+M)
2(1−m)(1 + τ)
where
M =
√
4(1− a)(1−m)am+ (1− a−m)2τ 2. (7)
Denote the equilibrium match probability of a recommendation draw for consumers of type t in
market conﬁguration c by αct . The above solution implies that
αww1 =
2 am− (a+m− 1)τ −M
2(a+m− 1)
αww2 =
m(2− 2a+ τ)− (1− a)(2 + τ) +M
2(a+m− 1) .
(8)
Consider next market conﬁgurations WA and AW, where only one type searches with WOM.
Only consumers of the type searching with WOM will provide recommendations, so recommenda-
tions always yield a match. Therefore,
swa1 =w β1
saw2 =w β2
αwa1 =1
αaw2 =1.
(9)
For types that search only the assortment in conﬁgurations WA, AW, and AA, let sct denote
the indiﬀerent participant of type t in market conﬁguration c. The solution is given by saˆt in (4),
saw1 =a(u− p1)
swa2 =(1− a)(u− p2)
saa1 =a(u− p1)
saa2 =(1− a)(u− p2).
Lemma 1. Consumer search strategies as a function of prices {p1, p2} are characterized by sam-
pling cost cutoﬀs {sc1, sc2} in market conﬁguration c ∈ {ww,wa, aw, aa}: consumers of type t with
low sampling cost search the assortment (si ≤ sct) and consumers with high sampling cost (si > sct)
search with word of mouth (mainstream consumers in conﬁgurations WW and WA, niche con-
sumers in conﬁgurations WW and AW) or otherwise stay out of the market. This implies that
consumers who search with word of mouth have a lower willingness to pay than those who search
the assortment, and mainstream consumers beneﬁt more from word of mouth than niche consumers.
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Figure 1: On the left, expected utility of both search strategies for mainstream and niche consumers
as a function of their sampling cost si keeping other factors equal. Mainstream consumers stand
to beneﬁt the most from word of mouth. On the right, search strategy choices as a function of
preference matching τ . Mainstream advantage decreases with the value of word of mouth for
consumers.
Consumers evaluate the expected utility of both search strategies when deciding whether to
participate or not in the market and which search strategy to pursue. The cost of each draw diﬀers
between searching the assortment and searching with word of mouth depending on the consumer's
sampling cost si and recommendation cost w. The expected number of draws required to locate a
match also diﬀers. The odds when drawing from the assortment depend on the assortment's com-
position, and the odds when drawing recommendations depend on the composition of consumers
providing recommendations and the degree of preference matching τ . It is useful to deﬁne the
value of word of mouth as a function of τ and w:
Deﬁnition. The value of word of mouth for all consumers increases with the degree of prefer-
ence matching τ and decreases with recommendation cost w.
An increase in the value of word of mouth reduces the search costs consumers incur to locate
a match with recommendations.6 If the value of word of mouth is too low, some consumers will
prefer to stay out of the market instead of searching with word of mouth. I next focus on the case
where consumers of both types are willing to search with word of mouth (market conﬁguration
WW), which is the case where the interactions between types is of most interest.
The left panel in Figure 1 plots the expected utility of search strategies. Utilities are plotted
for the benchmark case where the assortment share and the price of both product types coincide
(a = 1/2 and p1 = p2), which implies that the expected utility of searching the assortment also
6Recommendations enjoy no salience in the model, because consumers do not place additional value on a match
that results from a recommendation. Senecal and Nantel (2004) report a series of experiments that suggest rec-
ommendations have an inﬂuential eﬀect on consumers beyond awareness. If salient recommendations increase the
utility consumers derive from a product match, then salience can be interpreted to increase the value of word of
mouth in the market.
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coincides for both types Ua1,i = U
a
2,i. Note that consumers with low sampling costs prefer to search
the assortment and consumers with high sampling costs prefer to search with word of mouth.
This follows from the fact that consumers with low sampling costs suﬀer comparatively less from
failed assortment draws than consumers with high sampling costs. Thus consumers who choose
to search with word of mouth incur higher search costs than those who search the assortment,
and as a result exhibit a lower willingness to pay. The sampling cost cutoﬀs between both search
strategies sww1 and s
ww
2 also vary across types due to the interdependencies that arise with word of
mouth: the larger the share of consumers of a given type that search the assortment and provide
recommendations, the lower the expected number of recommendation draws required by consumers
of that type to locate a match.
An important property of the solution is that mainstream consumers beneﬁt more from word
of mouth. This is due to the fact that mainstream consumers enjoy a higher success rate when
drawing recommendation than niche consumers (αww1 > α
ww
2 ) because more mainstream consumers
provide recommendations. Simply stated, they beneﬁt from the fact that their preferences are more
prevalent in the population. This mainstream advantage increases with mainstream population m
and decreases with the value of word of mouth, because eﬃciency improvements in the word of
mouth process beneﬁt niche consumers comparatively more. The right panel in Figure 1 illustrates
the eﬀect by plotting search strategy choices as a function of preference matching τ : the higher
the value of word of mouth (higher τ) the closer the sampling cost cutoﬀs of both types, and thus
the lower the advantage of mainstream consumes. Reductions in recommendation cost w have a
similar eﬀect.
The preceding analysis characterizes positive word of mouth, given that consumers providing
recommendations inform others about the products they matched with (products they derive utility
from). This reﬂects the observation that consumers tend to discuss the media products they enjoy,
rather than the ones they do not. However, consumers could also provide recommendations about
products they became informed about that did not yield a match, due to failed draws from the
assortment. Both positive and negative word of mouth would then coexist in the market. In this
case, when consumers providing recommendations draw randomly from their search history and all
recommendations are informative about products, it can be shown that the match probability with
recommendations is equivalent to that of drawing directly from the assortment, αt = βt. Word
of mouth then provides more information about products with a lower match probability for the
majority of consumers. This hurts mainstream consumers and beneﬁts niche consumers, so the
consumer population as a whole is better oﬀ with positive word of mouth only.7
7It is worth stressing that negative word of mouth can generate sales in the context of horizontally diﬀerentiated
products. Consumers care about how products ﬁt with their idiosyncratic preferences and not about their ﬁt with
other consumers (e.g., a mainstream consumer engaging in negative word of mouth about a niche product can yield
a match for a niche consumer). In the context of vertically diﬀerentiated products, negative word of mouth tends
to reduce sales because all consumers agree on the determinants of product utility. The literature suggests that the
underprovision of recommendations and their manipulation by interested parties are relevant factors in this context.
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4 Equilibrium prices and market conﬁgurations
I turn to the ﬁrm's pricing problem in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Before proceeding, it is useful to
put additional structure on the problem to rule out market conﬁguration multiplicity for certain
price ranges:
Assumption. When prices p1 and p2 are such that both market conﬁguration WA and market
conﬁguration AW can be sustained, conﬁguration WA prevails in the marketplace.
The assumption ensures that the equilibrium of the pricing game is unique. For certain prices
the market can only sustain word of mouth by a single consumer type and this generates equilibrium
multiplicity.8 Intuitively, word of mouth is most valuable for consumers when those participating
in the exchange exhibit the same preferences, and for some prices it can be supported by either
mainstream consumers or niche consumers. The assumption resolves this multiplicity by select-
ing the equilibrium where mainstream consumers prevail (or equivalently, the welfare-maximizing
equilibrium). This can be interpreted as the mainstream majority crowding out the niche minority
in the word of mouth exchange when the participation of both is unsustainable. The assumption
reduces the equilibrium region of market conﬁguration AW but does not aﬀect the qualitative
results of the analysis.
I next characterize the ﬁrm's demand and the price region for each market conﬁguration to arise.
Then I analyze the ﬁrm's optimal pricing within each conﬁguration. I determine the properties of
the equilibrium by comparing the ﬁrm's proﬁt frontiers across the four conﬁgurations.
Firm demand. The demand for products of type t depends on the participation of consumers
of type t in the market, which in turn depends on their search strategy choices. Let Dct denote
the demand for products of type t in market conﬁguration c. Note that Dct is only well deﬁned
for prices such that conﬁguration c holds, that is, prices that ensure consumer search strategy
choices are consistent with conﬁguration c. Demands can be written based on the characterization
of consumer search strategies derived in Lemma 1,
Dww1 = D
wa
1 =m
Dww2 = D
aw
2 =1−m
Daw1 = D
aa
1 =
(u− p1)a
s¯
m
Dwa2 = D
aa
2 =
(u− p2)(1− a)
s¯
(1−m).
(10)
I next characterize the price region for each market conﬁguration to hold. Let pct denote the
Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser (1999) characterize reward schemes for the optimal provision of recommendations
and Dellarocas (2006) analyzes the implications of strategic manipulation of recommendations.
8Multiplicity arises for prices where both µw1 ≥ 0 and µw2 < 0 (conﬁguration WA) as well as µw1 < 0 and µw2 ≥ 0
(conﬁguration AW) can be sustained in equilibrium. The precise range of prices is characterized by p1 ∈ [pww1 , pwa1 ]
and p2 ∈ [pww2 , paw2 ].
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Figure 2: On the left, price regions of the four market conﬁgurations. On the right, demand for
mainstream products when p2 < p
ww
2 , which encompasses conﬁgurations WW and AW.
threshold price which ensures consumers of type t searching with WOM in market conﬁguration c
are indiﬀerent between participating or not in the market. Plugging αct in (8) and (9) into µ
w
t in
(2), and substituting pt for p
c
t to solve for µ
w
t (p
c
t) = 0 in each case identiﬁes the following threshold
prices,
pww1 =u−
2 am− (1− a−m)τ +M
2 am(1 + τ)
w
pww2 =u−
2(1− a−m)
2(1 + am− a−m) + τ(1− a−m)−M w
pwa1 =u− w
paw2 =u− w,
(11)
where M is given by (7).
The left panel in Figure 2 depicts the price regions of the four market conﬁgurations given
the threshold prices derived above. By assumption, note that WA prevails in the central region
delimited by the four threshold prices. The right panel illustrates the ﬁrm's problem by plotting
the demand for mainstream products when p2 < p
ww
2 . There is a high level of demand when
mainstream consumers search with WOM, that is, when mainstream products are priced below
threshold price pww1 . When mainstream products are priced above p
ww
1 , mainstream consumers
search the assortment only and this reduces demand because consumers with high sampling costs
do not participate. The demand curve therefore encompasses two market conﬁgurations, and is
composed by Dww1 in the low price range and D
aw
1 in the high price range (as shown in the left
panel, pww1 is the frontier between conﬁgurations WW and AW when p2 < p
ww
2 ).
Firm pricing. I next analyze the ﬁrm's pricing problem by separately considering each of
the four market conﬁgurations. Denote the ﬁrm's proﬁts in market conﬁguration c by pic, where
pic = Dc1 p1 + D
c
2 p2 given demands in (10). First, inspection of price regions for conﬁgurations
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WW, WA, and AA, depicted in the left panel of Figure 2, reveals that the ﬁrm can set any feasible
price for one type without constraining the feasible price range for the other type (i.e., the regions
are rectangular). For conﬁguration AW, however, the ﬁrm has to choose between setting a high p2
and setting a low p1 (i.e., the price region is not rectangular). Inspection of pi
aw reveals that the
ﬁrm solves this tradeoﬀ by always setting the highest feasible price p2.
9
I proceed to identify the ﬁrm's optimal prices within each of the four market conﬁgurations.
Inspection of pic across the four conﬁgurations reveals that ∂pic/∂pt > 0 for types t that search with
WOM in conﬁguration c. For types that do not search with WOM, solving ﬁrst-order condition
∂pic/∂pt = 0 obtains pt = u/2 in all cases. Inspection of second-order conditions conﬁrms that
this solution is indeed a maximum in all cases. Let pct (with a slight abuse of notation) denote the
optimal price for products of type t in market conﬁguration c. Based on the preceding analysis,
optimal prices for types that search with WOM coincide with threshold prices in (11). For types
that do not search with WOM, optimal prices are given by
pwa2 =
u/2 if u/2 > pww2pww2 otherwise
paw1 =
u/2 if u/2 > pwa1pwa1 otherwise
paa1 =
u/2 if u/2 > pwa1pwa1 otherwise
paa2 =
u/2 if u/2 > paw2paw2 otherwise
(12)
Equilibrium market conﬁgurations. Given optimal prices within each market conﬁgura-
tion, the ﬁrm will compare proﬁts across the four conﬁgurations when choosing which prices to
set. Substituting optimal prices given in (11) and (12) into pic obtains the ﬁrm's proﬁt frontier for
each market conﬁguration, to be denoted by pic
∗
. The ﬁrm's problem is then equivalent to choosing
among the four possible market conﬁgurations.
I characterize the ﬁrm's solution as a function of word of mouth cost w. First, consider the
ranking of the four proﬁt frontier curves in the corner cases w = 0 and w = u. When w = 0,
prices in (12) bind and piww
∗
> piwa
∗
> piaw
∗
> piaa
∗
. When w = u, prices in (12) do not bind,
and piww
∗
< piwa
∗
<> piaw
∗
< piaa
∗
(where the ordering of piwa
∗
and piaw
∗
varies depending on the
remaining parameters). Next, consider the intersections between the proﬁt frontier curves in the
range w ∈ (0, u). Inspection reveals that each pair of proﬁt curves intersect at most once in this
9Inspection of piaw reveals that it attains a higher value on the segment given by p2 = p
aw
2 and p1 ∈ [pwa1 , u]
than in the remaining of the region. Thus the ﬁrm's price solution in region AW must be located in the uppermost
frontier of the region. This implies that the lower bound on paw1 in (12) is given by p
wa
1 (and not p
ww
1 ), given that
p1 < p
wa
1 would trigger a shift to market conﬁguration WA.
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range. Denote the intersection between proﬁt frontier curves pic
∗
and pic
′∗
by wˆcc′ . It can be shown
that 0 < wˆwwwa < wˆ
wa
aw < wˆ
aw
aa < u, except when m → 1/2 and a → 1 in which case wˆwaaw < wˆwwaw as
well as 0 < wˆwwaw < wˆ
aw
aa < u hold.
Consider the impact of a change in preference matching parameter τ . Inspection reveals that
∂piww
∗
/∂τ > 0, and the remaining proﬁt curves are unaﬀected because τ only impacts αt when
both types search with WOM. Thus ∂wˆwwwa /∂τ > 0 and ∂wˆ
ww
aw /∂τ > 0, so an increase in τ expands
ﬁrm proﬁts under market conﬁguration WW and extends the equilibrium range (over w) for such
conﬁguration to hold. The above characterization of the ﬁrm's frontier proﬁt curves provides the
following result.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium market conﬁgurations as a function of w are characterized by the
(w-ordered) sequence {WW, WA, AW, AA}, except when m → 1/2 and a → 1 in which case
{WW, AW, AA}. The ﬁrm sets prices pc1 and p
c
2 in (11) and (12) for each conﬁguration c, and
ﬁrm proﬁts are decreasing in w (across conﬁgurations WW, WA, and AW) and increasing in τ (in
conﬁguration WW). Therefore, the higher the value of word of mouth for consumers, the larger the
volume of sales and the higher the ﬁrm's proﬁts.
Word of mouth has two main eﬀects on the ﬁrm's pricing problem. First, it intensiﬁes the
tradeoﬀ between price and quantity: low prices ensure word of mouth arises and this expands
demand, but high prices preclude word of mouth and thereby contract demand. To understand
the eﬀect, recall that consumers who search with word of mouth are those with high sampling
costs and low willingness to pay. When product prices are high, those consumers prefer to stay out
of the market and do not purchase. Thus the ﬁrm's demand curve for each product type has two
components, one corresponding to the low price range where word of mouth arises (high demand)
and another corresponding to the high price range where it does not (low demand). Mainstream
demand is plotted in the right panel in Figure 2, and niche demand exhibits equivalent properties.
Second, the ﬁrm needs to discount prices to attract more consumer types to word of mouth.
When more than one consumer type searches with word of mouth, the exchange of recommen-
dations across types implies that consumers incur unsuccessful recommendation draws (αt < 1).
Thus the ﬁrm has to further discount prices for both types to search with word of mouth (conﬁgu-
ration WW) compared to the prices that can be sustained for one type alone to search with word
of mouth (conﬁgurations WA and AW).
The ﬁrm's solution is plotted in Figure 3. The left panel plots equilibrium proﬁts and the right
panel plots equilibrium prices for both product types (mainstream prices are solid, niche prices are
dashed), both as a function of recommendation cost w. When w is very high, so that the value of
word of mouth for consumers is low, the ﬁrm sets high prices and word of mouth does not arise in
the market (conﬁguration AA). When w is very low, so that the value of word of mouth is high, the
ﬁrm prices to ensure that both types search with word of mouth (conﬁguration WW). For interim
values of w, however, the ﬁrm sets prices to foster word of mouth for one type and preclude it for
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Figure 3: Firm proﬁts on the left and product prices on the right (mainstream prices are solid and
niche prices are dashed) as a function of recommendation cost w. Firm proﬁts are increasing in
the value of word of mouth for consumers.
the other type (conﬁgurations WA and AW). By doing so, the ﬁrm beneﬁts from some degree of
word of mouth while avoiding the exchange of recommendations across types (αt = 1).
10
The ﬁrm's optimal pricing strategy is to sustain high prices while ensuring that word of mouth
arises, discounting prices if necessary. When the value of word of mouth is low, this implies that
the ﬁrm discounts prices for types that search with recommendations, and when the value of
word of mouth is high the ﬁrm charges a premium. When both types search with word of mouth
(conﬁguration WW) the ﬁrm sets higher prices for mainstream products than for niche products.
The population advantage enjoyed by mainstream consumers implies that they incur lower search
costs than niche consumers, so the ﬁrm can extract more surplus from them while still ensuring
their participation.
The ﬁrm has strong incentives to increase the value of word of mouth for consumers. That is,
reducing consumer search costs allows the ﬁrm to appropriate a larger share of consumer surplus,
and increasing the eﬃciency of word of mouth serves this purpose. As shown in the left panel
of Figure 3, ﬁrm proﬁts are increasing in the value of word of mouth (proﬁts are decreasing in
w across conﬁgurations WW, WA, and AW, and increasing in τ in conﬁguration WW). This
provides a rationale for online retailers to facilitate the exchange of product recommendations on
their websites and implement recommender systems that generate personalized recommendations
10The ﬁrm prefers mainstream word of mouth when w is lower (conﬁguration WA) and niche word of mouth when
w is higher (conﬁguration AW). A higher w implies the ﬁrm has to discount prices more aggressively to foster word
of mouth. Also note that the demand expansion generated by mainstream word of mouth (Dwa1 −Daa1 ) diﬀers from
that generated by niche word of mouth Daw2 −Daa2 ): there is a larger mass of mainstream consumers (m > 1/2),
but mainstream consumers tend to participate more than niche consumers when searching only the assortment
because there is a larger share of mainstream products (a > 1/2). These factors imply that conﬁguration WA
is generally more proﬁtable than AW for lower values of w, and vice versa. The equilibrium range over w where
market conﬁguration WA holds increases in m and decreases in a, and it can be shown that AW is proﬁt-dominated
(by WA and AA) in the corner case a = 1/2, and WA is proﬁt-dominated (by AW) in the parameter range where
m→ 1/2 and a→ 1.
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for their customers.
I have analyzed the base scenario where the ﬁrm quotes separate prices for mainstream and
niche products. If the ﬁrm commits to a single price scheme for all products, the optimal price is
a population-weighted average of the prices characterized above. If the ﬁrm can price-discriminate
consumers based on their search strategies, it can be shown that higher prices are charged to those
searching the assortment than to those searching with word of mouth. The eﬀect analyzed by
Kuksov and Xie (2010) of providing lower prices or unexpected frills to early customers in order
to proﬁt from later customers is not present, as the utility enjoyed by consumers searching the
assortment does not aﬀect the expected utility of consumers searching with word of mouth.
The ﬁrm's solution is derived in the context of a pull-based word of mouth process, where
the provision of recommendations is driven by those seeking them. In a push-based process,
the provision of recommendations is driven by those possessing information, so that consumers
searching the assortment provide recommendations independently of who seeks them. This aﬀects
conﬁgurations WA and AW, where the exchange of recommendations across types does not arise
in the above analysis but would do so in the context of a push-based process. Unfortunately, a
closed-form solution for these push-based cases cannot be derived due to the complexity of the
pricing problem. However, inspection of the problem reveals that these conﬁgurations become less
proﬁtable for the ﬁrm, because precluding consumers of one type from searching with word of
mouth no longer reduces search costs for the other type. A push-based process therefore reduces
ﬁrm proﬁts in conﬁgurations WA and AW, reducing the equilibrium range over w where those
conﬁgurations hold and expanding that of conﬁgurations WW and AA, and is less desirable for
the ﬁrm than a pull-based process.
5 The eﬀect of word of mouth on sales concentration
I next examine the concentration of sales within the assortment. The exercise is of interest to
understand how improvements in the value of word of mouth, such as those driven by online retail,
aﬀect the relative sales of mainstream and niche products. I proceed by characterizing equilibrium
market shares of mainstream and niche products in each market conﬁguration and then use the
Herﬁndahl index to rank the four conﬁgurations according to sales concentration.
Denote the equilibrium market share of products of type t in market conﬁguration c by MSct .
The Herﬁndahl index is deﬁned as
Hc = (MSc1)
2 + (MSc2)
2.
When the diﬀerence between mainstream and niche market shares is large,MSc1 MSc2, the value
of the index is high (high sales concentration) because most sales occur within one product type.
When the diﬀerence is small, MSc1 ≈MSc2, the value of the index is low (low sales concentration)
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because sales are evenly spread among both. Thus, if mainstream products always outsell niche
products so that sales ranks are preserved, an increase in the market share of mainstream products
increases index H and a decrease in their market share reduces index H.11
Sales concentration. Market shares are derived by dividing the sales volume generated by
products of each type over total sales volume across the assortment, MSct = D
c
t/(D
c
t +D
c
−t), where
demands are given in (10). The market shares of mainstream products can be written as a function
of equilibrium prices in (11) and (12),
MSww1 =m
MSwa1 =
m s¯
m s¯+ (u− pwa2 )(1− a)(1−m)
MSaw1 =
am(u− paw1 )
am(u− paw1 ) + (1−m)s¯
MSaa1 =
am(u− paa1 )
am(u− paa1 ) + (u− paa2 )(1− a)(1−m)
,
and the market shares of niche products are given by MSc2 = 1 − MSc1 in all cases. It can
be shown that MSaw1 < MS
ww
1 < MS
aa
1 < MS
wa
1 always holds. Inspection of index H as a
function of equilibrium market shares MSc1 and MS
c
2 across the four market conﬁgurations yields
the following result.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium sales concentration across the four market conﬁgurations when main-
stream products outsell niche products satisﬁes Haw < Hww < Haa < Hwa. An increase in the
value of word of mouth that preserves the sales ranks of products can trigger:
(I) A conﬁguration shift from AW to WW, which incorporates mainstream consumers into word
of mouth and increases the concentration of sales generating a superstar eﬀect.
(II) A conﬁguration shift from WA to WW, which incorporates niche consumers into word of
mouth and reduces the concentration of sales generating a long tail eﬀect.
The result explains how eﬃciency improvements in word of mouth trigger shifts in the concen-
tration of sales. Recall that only one consumer type participates in word of mouth when its value is
low (market conﬁgurations WA and AW) but both types participate when it is high (conﬁguration
WW). Thus an increase in the value of word of mouth can incorporate new consumer types into
the process. Proposition 2 shows that incorporating mainstream consumers (shift from AW to
11I restrict the analysis to the case of empirical interest where mainstream products outsell niche products in
equilibrium. The review of the empirical literature in Section 1.1 suggests that, despite shifts in sales concentration,
products in the head of the sales distribution signiﬁcantly outperform those in the tail before and after observed shifts
(i.e., sales ranks are preserved). In the model, niche products can outperform mainstream products in conﬁguration
AW when bothm and a are low. In that case, it can be shown that Haw > Hww ifMSaw1 MSaw2 . A conﬁguration
shift from AW to WW then reduces the concentration of sales and reverses the sales rank of mainstream and niche
products, implying that the superstar eﬀect in Proposition 2 is no longer present. The long tail eﬀect continues to
hold, however.
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WW) increases the relative sales of mainstream products, and this increases the concentration of
sales within the assortment. Incorporating niche consumers into word of mouth (shift from WA to
WW) increases the relative sales of niche products, which reduces the concentration of sales. The
left panel in Figure 4 plots product market shares in these conﬁgurations to illustrate the result.
The mechanisms predicted by the model contribute to explain the empirical evidence on lower
sales concentration in online retail. The literature reviewed in Section 1.1 ﬁnds that sales con-
centration is lower in the online channel than in the oine channel, that online recommender
systems contribute to this eﬀect, and that online word of mouth has a larger impact on niche
consumers. The model can reconcile these ﬁndings. The ﬁrm proﬁts from increasing the value of
word of mouth for consumers, and thus online retailers have incentives to facilitate the provision of
product recommendations on their websites and implement recommender systems. This beneﬁts
niche consumers the most, because it mitigates the population advantage enjoyed by mainstream
consumers in oine word of mouth. As a result, niche consumers participate more in the market
and the ﬁrm adjusts prices accordingly, which reduces the concentration of sales generating a long
tail eﬀect.
The result is closely related to Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2012) and Yang (2013). These
papers also contribute theoretical search foundations to explain lower sales concentration in online
retail. In both cases, the authors analyze the interaction between consumer search strategies and
the variety of products supplied in the market. Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cuñat (2012) show that
lower consumer search costs can drive ﬁrms to supply rare product designs, and Yang (2013) shows
that improvements in consumer search, either through lower search costs or better targetability,
can drive ﬁrms to produce less popular product varieties that would otherwise remain unavail-
able. Both eﬀects reduce the concentration of sales in the market. The argument developed here
focuses on consumer interactions during search while keeping the supply of products ﬁxed. This
explains the concentration shifts observed within ﬁrms that supply identical product assortments
through both online and oine retail channels. Nonetheless, the three mechanisms are complemen-
tary. Taken together, the ﬁndings suggest that improvements in consumer search targetability and
product recommendations together with supply-side changes in product design and availability all
contribute to the long tail phenomenon.
The model also shows that word of mouth improvements that beneﬁt mainstream consumers
the most increase the concentration of sales. This generates a superstar eﬀect, reinforcing best-
seller products. The result can be reconciled with the empirical evidence on popularity feedback
mechanisms (e.g., bestseller charts), which have been shown to beneﬁt best-selling products in
the head of the sales distribution. Salganik, Dodds and Watts (2006) study demand over a set
of rare songs oﬀered to test subjects on the Internet, and Tucker and Zhang (2011) analyze the
click-through rates of a webpage indexing marriage agencies. In both cases popularity feedback
increases concentration and consumer participation, as is the case of the superstar eﬀect here.
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Figure 4: On the left, market shares of mainstream and niche products in the three market con-
ﬁgurations with word of mouth. A conﬁguration shift from WA to WW reduces the concentration
of sales generating a long tail eﬀect. On the right, the ﬁrm's optimal assortment composition
bias in conﬁguration WW. The higher the degree of preference matching, the higher the weight of
mainstream products in the assortment.
6 Optimal assortment composition
The model assumes by construction that both mainstream and niche products are supplied, but
the ﬁrm can alter their weight in the assortment or the prominence with which they are displayed.
When the eﬃciency of word of mouth increases, as is the case in online retail, should the ﬁrm
increase the weight of niche products in its assortment or promote mainstream products instead?
To answer this question, I examine the ﬁrm's optimal assortment composition when both consumer
types search with word of mouth.12
I incorporate the assortment choice into the timing of the game. Consider the game where
the ﬁrm chooses assortment composition a in the ﬁrst stage, sets prices p1 and p2 in the second
stage, and consumers search the assortment and search with word of mouth in the third and fourth
stages, respectively. I restrict the analysis to market conﬁguration WW and the cases where an
interior solution for a is well deﬁned. Consumer search strategies and optimal prices carry over
from the preceding analysis, so I proceed to solve the ﬁrm's assortment choice in the ﬁrst stage
given the ﬁrm's proﬁt frontier piww
∗
. Denote the ﬁrm's optimal assortment composition in this
market conﬁguration by aww
∗
. Inspection of ﬁrst-order condition ∂piww
∗
/∂a = 0 identiﬁes two
candidate solutions. The second-order condition reveals that only the following is a maximum,
aww
∗
=
(1−m)(2m− τ 2) +√(1− 2m)2(1−m)mτ 2
4(1−m)m− τ 2 ,
12The model provides an interior solution for a in market conﬁguration WW, which is the conﬁguration most
relevant to online retail. Unfortunately, other market conﬁgurations yield only corner solutions for a. Fully en-
dogenizing assortment composition across all conﬁgurations is a complex problem which requires a richer model
speciﬁcation to account for the availability of diﬀerent product types, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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and aww
∗ ∈ (1
2
, 1) so that the ﬁrm chooses an interior solution when τ < τˆ where
τˆ =
√
1−m
m
.
Otherwise the ﬁrm chooses a corner solution because aww
∗ ≥ 1.
Proposition 3. The ﬁrm's optimal assortment composition when both consumer types search with
word of mouth (market conﬁguration WW) and preference matching is not very high, τ < τˆ , is
given by aww
∗
. This implies that the ﬁrm over-represents niche products in the assortment relative
to the consumer population's preferences when preference matching τ is low, and over-represents
mainstream products when it is high.
Word of mouth presents the following tradeoﬀ for the ﬁrm choosing the composition of its
assortment. Increasing the share of one product type in the assortment reduces the search costs
incurred by consumers of that type at the expense of increasing the search costs incurred by
the other type. For example, an increase in the share of mainstream products increases the
odds for mainstream consumers searching the assortment, which in turn increases the provision
of recommendations by mainstream consumers (higher β1 and α
ww
1 ). This results in lower search
costs for mainstream consumers and higher search costs for niche consumers (due to lower β2 and
αww2 ). The ﬁrm's tradeoﬀ is as follows. On the one hand, mainstream consumers generate most of
the ﬁrm's sales. On the other hand, niche consumers incur higher search costs due to their word of
mouth disadvantage. So increasing the share of mainstream products in the assortment provides a
small search cost reduction for the large mass of mainstream consumers at the expense of a larger
search cost increase for the smaller mass of niche consumers.
The ﬁrm's solution hinges on the degree of preference matching τ , which determines the com-
parative word of mouth advantage of mainstream consumers over niche consumers. The right
panel in Figure 4 illustrates the result. When the degree of preference matching is low, the ﬁrm
over-represents niche products in the assortment relative to the share of niche consumers in the
population (aww
∗
< m), because reducing niche consumer search costs has the largest impact on
proﬁts. When the degree of preference matching is high, the ﬁrm chooses instead to over-represent
mainstream products in the assortment (aww
∗
> m) because in this case reducing the search costs
of mainstream consumers has the largest impact.
The result suggests that the long tail eﬀect should not drive the ﬁrm to focus on niche products,
at least not at the expense of mainstream products. Though improvements in the eﬃciency of
word of mouth increase the relative sales of niche products in the tail of the sales distribution,
mainstream products in the head of the distribution still account for most of the ﬁrm's revenues.
Moreover, the search improvements that lead niche consumers to more easily locate their preferred
products also reduce the downsides of promoting mainstream products. Therefore, even as the
market share of niche products increases, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ promoting mainstream products
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instead.
7 Managerial implications
I next summarize the managerial implications of the analysis. I use a causal loop diagram to
represent the logic of value creation and appropriation by the ﬁrm in the presence of consumer word
of mouth, following the methodology proposed by Casadesus-Masanell and Enric Ricart (2010).
Figure 5 provides the representation. Underlined elements are choices made by the ﬁrm, and
non-underlined elements are consequences. Arrows connect causes with consequences to identify
positive feedback loops. Dashed arrows identify negative feedback loops. Elements inside a box
are rigid consequences or stocks, which accumulate over time and change slowly in response to the
feedback loops that cause them.
The representation describes the implications of word of mouth for the ﬁrm's business model in
the presence of the long tail eﬀect (market conﬁguration WW). The logic is best illustrated with
an online retailer, so consider the case of Amazon discussed in the introduction. Focusing on the
ﬁrm's choices in the lower part of the diagram, Amazon provides personalized recommendations on
its storefront and product pages, which increases the value of word of mouth on its store compared
to oine interactions (reduces w and increases τ). As shown in the analysis, a consequence of
this choice is lower sales concentration within the assortment compared to oine retail channels
(conﬁguration shift to WW which beneﬁts niche consumers). Amazon also chooses to promote
mainstream products on its storefront (high τ suggests that high a must be optimal). The previous
choices jointly contribute to lower consumer search costs, and this increases sales volume. In
turn, higher sales volume and lower sales concentration provide Amazon with more consumer
feedback about more products through browsing activity, ratings, and reviews (consumers of both
types provide recommendations in conﬁguration WW). This point is important, because Amazon
depends on consumer feedback to feed its recommender system and supply personalized product
recommendations, which closes the two loops around consumer feedback.
The two loops described are in fact virtuous cycles, because Amazon accumulates a larger stock
of consumer feedback over time. Although the model is static, it should be clear that this can
be a source of competitive advantage for the ﬁrm versus competitors that do not exploit word of
mouth, or have been slower to do so. By iterating over these cycles Amazon accumulates a larger
stock of consumer feedback, creating more value for its customers and becoming the go to place
for them to discover products that match their taste. This reinforces Amazon's choices to feature
product recommendations and promote mainstream products.
Amazon sets high prices to appropriate the value it generates through lower search costs.
Note however that there are two sources of tension (or negative loops) the ﬁrm needs to manage
carefully. The ﬁrst one relates to pricing. The ﬁrm prices to appropriate consumer surplus, but
does so ensuring that consumers with high sampling costs who rely on word of mouth remain willing
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Figure 5: The implications of the analysis for the ﬁrm's business model. Underlined elements
identify the choices of the ﬁrm and non-underlined elements are consequences. Arrows connect
causes with consequences.
to participate (optimal prices ensure that µw1 = 0 and µ
w
2 = 0 in conﬁguration WW). That is, the
ﬁrm strikes a balance between high prices and the sales volume derived from word of mouth. The
second source of tension relates to the prominence of mainstream products. Promoting mainstream
products beneﬁts mainstream consumers but hurts niche consumers (higher β1 and α
ww
1 but lower
β2 and α
ww
2 ). So the ﬁrm also needs to strike a balance between promoting mainstream products
and the demand for niche products in the tail of the sales distribution.
8 Concluding remarks
I have analyzed the role of word of mouth for consumer product discovery in horizontally diﬀeren-
tiated product categories. The results can be summarized by noting that the exchange of product
recommendations reduces consumer search costs, but those with less prevalent preferences and the
products that appeal to them beneﬁt less due to the mechanisms underlying traditional word of
mouth interactions. The online environment provides an opportunity for the ﬁrm to facilitate word
of mouth and implement recommender systems, which beneﬁts all consumers but has a larger im-
pact on those with less prevalent preferences. This increases the market share of niche products in
the tail of the sales distribution, reducing the concentration of sales within the ﬁrm's assortment.
Improvements in online word of mouth therefore contribute to explain the long tail phenomenon.
Firms with lower inventory costs stand to beneﬁt the most from the long tail eﬀect. These
ﬁrms can increase the depth of their assortment beyond that of competitors, ensuring they are well
positioned to serve the demand for niche products in the tail of the sales distribution. So online
retailers pioneering the implementation of recommender systems have also increased the value of
stocking a deeper assortment than brick and mortar competitors. The analysis suggests caution
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against excessive focus on niche products, however. Because the online environment facilitates
product discovery and mainstream products contribute the most to sales volume, the ﬁrm is better
oﬀ responding to the long tail eﬀect by increasing the prominence of mainstream products. In fact,
the ﬁrm can proﬁt from over-representing mainstream products in the assortment relative to their
potential customer base.
The implications of the ﬁndings for competition are worth stressing. Firms with a large cus-
tomer base will proﬁt the most from online word of mouth and recommender systems. These
systems beneﬁt from a large stock of consumer feedback to improve their accuracy and exhibit a
learning curve to identify the preferences of new customers. Consumers will receive less accurate
recommendations when switching purchases across ﬁrms and, in general, when patronizing smaller
ﬁrms. Both factors suggest that the ﬁrm can exploit consumer word of mouth to grow its customer
base and outperform competitors over time.
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